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Abstract
This essay argues that monetary theories should not contain an undeﬁned object
labeled money. Among existing theories that do not satisfy that dictum are models
which assume that real balances are arguments of utility or production functions
and models which assume cash-in-advance constraints. A main weakness of
theories that do not satisfy the dictum is that they cannot address questions about
which objects constitute money. Theories that do satisfy the dictum are those
which specify assets by their physical properties and which permit the assets’ role
in exchange to be endogenous. The essay brieﬂy describes one such theory, a
random matching model with assets that differ according to whether they throw
off real dividends.
This essay is reprinted, with permission, from the book Foundations of Re-
search in Economics: How Do Economists Do Economics? (ed. Steven Medema
and Warren Samuels), Cheltenham, U.K.: Edward Elgar Publishing, 1996.
The views expressed herein are those of the author and not necessarily those of the Federal
Reserve Bank of Minneapolis or the Federal Reserve System.Since this is a volume about methodology and since my
long-standing concern is monetary theory, I will take this
opportunity to propose and defend a dictum, or rule, that
monetary theory ought to satisfy. The dictum can be put
quite simply: Money should not be a primitive in mone-
tary theory—in the same way that ﬁrm should not be a
primitive in industrial organization theory or bond a primi-
tive in ﬁnance theory. By way of introduction to monetary
theory, I start with a brief discussion of some of the chal-
lenges facing monetary theory and a brief review of exist-
ing theories. Then I present a more detailed statement of
the dictum and describe which among existing models do
and do not satisfy it. Then, primarily as a way to further
explain the dictum, I discuss in some detail one particular
model that satisﬁes it. I conclude with some comments in
defense of the dictum.
The Challenges Facing Monetary Theory
If for no other reason, we want monetary theories in order
toaddressquestionsaboutpolicy—questionsofthefollow-
ingsort.InTheWealthofNations(1776,Book2,Chap. 2),
Smith discussed whether the Scottish banks should be per-
mitted to continue their practice of issuing bank notes. The
general version of the question Smith discussed has been
withuseversince:Shouldweattempttodistinguishamong
private sector liabilities according to the extent to which
they play a role as a medium of exchange and regulate—
through outright prohibitions, taxes, or reserve require-
ments—thosethatplaythatroletotoogreatanextent?An-
other question concerns intervention in foreign exchange
markets: Should there be intervention and, if so, of what
sort? Another question concerns the conduct of monetary
policy: What rule should be followed by a central bank?
For example,was the FederalReserve right toallow nomi-
nal interest rates to rise sharply during 1994?
Each of these questions is controversial. Regarding the
ﬁrst, it would seem strange if a matter of degree, the ex-
tent to which securities play a medium-of-exchange role,
plays a role in whether we regulate or not—unless such
regulation is part of an optimal tax structure. Regarding
the second, since the general claims made for the virtues
of unfettered markets do not apply to ﬁat currencies, the
grounds for positions taken regarding such intervention
are far from obvious. As regards the third, the sort of pol-
icy engaged in by the Federal Reserve in 1994 is inconsis-
tent with many models.
1 We ought to be able to look to
monetary theory to help us resolve such controversies.
However,because mosttheories eitherfail toaddress these
questions or do so in an unconvincing way, there has been
little resolution.
The failure to address these questions convincingly is
partly due to their inherent difficulty. To address the ques-
tion about regulation of some private securities requires a
model in which there are private securities and in which
some play a medium-of-exchange role to a greater extent
than others. The term medium of exchange refers to the
transaction pattern among objects—to a feature of what
Clower (1967) called the payments matrix, a matrix that
describes what gets traded for what.
2 Most models in eco-
nomics have nothing to say about transaction patterns. The
question about intervention in foreign exchange markets
requires a model with several currencies—and, in particu-
lar, a model with several ﬁat (as opposed to commodity)
currencies. It is well known that getting one such object to
have value is difficult; when there are several, there can
alsoariseawell-knownindeterminacyofrelativevaluesof
the several ﬁat objects. (See, for example, Kareken and
Wallace 1981.) To address the question about central bank
policy requires a model in which currency coexists with
securities which, in some sense, dominate the currency in
termsofrateofreturn.AccordingtoHicks(1935),thiswas
the problem facing monetary theory, and most think it
remains a problem. (See, for example, Hellwig 1993.)
Existing Theories
It is widely agreed that in order to address questions like
these, we require a model different from the standard com-
petitivegeneralequilibrium(SGE)model.TheSGEmodel
has no implications for what gets traded for what, has no
room for a valued ﬁat object, and, because it has complete
markets which permit all assets to be traded at given prices
in any circumstance, does not solve Hicks’ coexistence
problem. Not surprisingly, then, all monetary theories de-
part from the SGE model. Moreover, we can go some way
toward describing their features by describing how they
departfromthatmodel.Althoughmydiscussionwillbefar
from exhaustive, it will include most familiar models—at
least those that satisfy a minimal degree of coherence.
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It is somewhat standard to describe a model in two
parts. One part is the physical environment—people and
their preferences, resources and the technology, and the in-
formation structure. The other part is the equilibrium con-
cept—therulesgoverninginteractionsamongpeople.Some
existing monetary models depart only from the physical
environment of the SGE model, others only from the equi-
librium concept of that model, and some from both. I take
up the existing models in that order.
Money-in-utility-function (MIUF) models and money-
in-production-function(MIPF)modelsaremodelsthatde-
part only from the physical environment of the SGE mod-
el. Obviously, such models have an easy time with Hicks’
coexistence problem and with valued ﬁat currency if the
object in the utility or production functions is identiﬁed
with a ﬁat currency. Not only is it a departure from the
SGE model to put assets into preferences and technolo-
gies; but for obvious reasons and as emphasized by Samu-
elson (1968), it is not sensible to put nominal quantities of
ﬁat objects into utility and production functions without
putting prices into them—usually combined in the form of
real balances.
4 Transaction cost models also depart only
from the physical environment of the SGE model. Hicks
(1935) suggested transaction costs as a solution to the co-
existence problem, and Baumol (1952) and Tobin (1956)
used inventory-theoretic models to implement Hicks’ sug-
gestion. There is a large literature on general equilibrium
models with transaction costs. (See Duffie 1990 and the
citationstherein.)Samuelson’s (1958)overlapping genera-
tions model also departs only from the physical environ-
ment of the SGE model, as does a recent asymmetric in-
formation model of Levine (1991).
Shubik’s (1973, 1990) work on trading-post models, or
market games, is the leading example of a model that de-
parts from the SGE model only by departing from its equi-
libriumconcept.Hisviewisthattradeoughttobemodeled
as an explicit noncooperative game and that if trade is so
modeled, then a role for an object that plays a medium-of-
exchange role may be found. Shubik’s initial work posited
trading posts that are pairwise in goods, one round of si-multaneous trade at all or a subset of all possible trading
posts, and a Nash-Cournot equilibrium concept. Cash-in-
advance (CIA) models seem to be another class of models
that depart only from the SGE equilibrium concept; such
models posit a particular kind of market incompleteness.
There is a close relationship between versions of Shubik
trading-post models and CIA models. Thus, a version of
Shubik’s model with N objects and N − 1 trading posts
indexed 1, 2, ..., N − 1, where trading post j is that at
which object j trades for object N and with one round of
simultaneous trade per time period, resembles a simple
CIA model in which cash is object N.
Finally, there are many models that depart from both
the physical environment and the equilibrium concept of
the SGE model. One class consists of models that pursue
the long-standing idea that monetary theory ought to work
with environments in which there is an absence of double
coincidence of wants. As far as I know, Ostroy (1973) was
the ﬁrst to use such a setting to try to ﬁnd a role for a me-
dium of exchange. He assumed that trade must be accom-
plished through meetings that are pairwise among people.
Pairwisemeetingsgonaturallywiththeabsence-of-double-
coincidence notion, as is evidenced by the fact that almost
every discussion of that notion presumes such meetings.
The ﬁrst fully coherent version of such a model with an
endogenous pattern of exchange seems to be Kiyotaki and
Wright’s (1989). That model departs from the physical en-
vironment of the SGE model through the assumption that
tradinghistoriesareprivateinformation.Asanequilibrium
concept, such models use Nash equilibrium together with
some bargaining rule to describe interactions in pairwise
meetings.
The Dictum and Its Bite
As noted above, the proposed dictum is that money should
not be a primitive in monetary theory. It is easy to describe
intheabstracthowtoconstructmodelsthatsatisfythisdic-
tum: specify both the physical environment and the equi-
librium concept of the model in a waythat does not rely on
the concept called money or force the modeler at the outset
to specify which objects will play a special role in trade.
The physical environment and the equilibrium concept
may include features that make trade difficult, more diffi-
cultthan intheSGEmodel—featuressuchastradingposts
that are pairwise in objects, asymmetric information, or
pairwise meetings. The model may also include assets that
differ in their physical characteristics. For example, some
assets may be indivisible and others not, some may be ﬁat
objects while others throw off a real dividend at each date,




a speciﬁcation, the model determines—but, in general, not
uniquelybecausetheremaybemultipleequilibria—theval-
ues of the different assets and their distinct roles, if any, in
exchange.
Some of the models mentioned above satisfy the dic-
tum, and others do not. MIUF and MIPF models do not,
while Samuelson’s (1958) overlapping generations model
and Levine’s (1991) asymmetric information model do.
As for transaction cost models, they may or may not.
Transaction cost models with transaction technologies that
favor some assets over others, a special case being the in-
ventory-theoreticmodels,donotsatisfythedictum.Aspec-
iﬁcationinwhichparticipantsinanytradeexperiencesome
disutility that is not related to what is traded satisﬁes the
dictum.
6 Shubik’s (1973, 1990) trading-post models may
or may not satisfy the dictum; those that specify that only
a strict subset of the possible trading posts are active do
not, while a version that permits all posts to be active does.
CIAmodelsdonotsatisfythedictum.Thepairwisematch-
ing models mentioned above do.
A Model That Satisﬁes the Dictum
To illustrate the gain from working with models that satis-
fy the dictum, I here describe and present some results for
a version of a pairwise matching model, one that is much
like the models in Shi 1995 and Trejos and Wright 1995.
I use the model to study possible coexistence between a
ﬁat object and an asset that throws off a constant real divi-
dend each period.
The environment is as follows. Time is discrete, and
the horizon is inﬁnite. There are N distinct nonstorable
goods at each date and a [0,1] continuum of each of N
types of people, where N ³ 3. Each type is specialized in
consumption and production in the following way, which
rules out double coincidences: a type i person, where i
runs over integers from 1 to N, consumes good i and pro-
duces good i + 1 (modulo N). Each person maximizes
expected discounted utility with discount factor bÎ(0,1),
where utility in a period is u(x)−yand x is the quantity
consumed while y is the quantity produced. The function
u is deﬁned on [0,¥) and is increasing and twice differen-
tiable, and u(0) = 0, u² <0 ,u ¢ (0) = ¥, and u¢(¥)=0 .
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People meet pairwise at random, and each person’s trad-
ing history is private information to the agent. These as-
sumptions rule out all but quid pro quo trade and, in par-
ticular, rule out credit. The only storable objects are indi-
visible assets, and each person has a storage capacity of
one unit of some asset. As noted above, there are two as-
sets. The dividend per unit of asset j is denoted rj ³ 0,
and the quantity of asset j per type is denoted Aj > 0. Any
dividend is a perfect substitute for the consumption good
of any type, and A1 + A2 < 1. This last inequality insures
that an asset distribution in which some people hold one
unit of some asset and others hold nothing is consistent
with all assets being held.
The sequence of actions within a period is as follows.
Each person begins a period holding either one unit of
one of the assets or nothing. Then people meet pairwise
at random and bargain. Then consumption occurs, where
consumption consists of any dividend on the asset brought
into the period plus any production provided by the trad-
ing partner. Then assets are transferred according to the
bargaining outcome. (According to this speciﬁcation, as-
sets are traded ex-dividend.)
If the asset distribution and the trading strategies are
symmetric over person types, then any trade that matters
must involve production. And since there are no double-
coincidence meetings, we have only to be concerned with
what happens in single-coincidence meetings—meetings
in which a (potential) consumer meets a (potential) pro-
ducer. In such meetings, there are two potential trading
situations: when the consumer has an asset and the pro-
ducer does not and when the consumer has a more valu-
able asset than has the producer. In the former situation,
the asset may be traded for some production. In the latter
situation, the more valuable asset may be traded for someproduction and the less valuable asset. I assume the fol-
lowing very simple bargaining rule: the consumer makes
a take-it-or-leave-it offer, and the producer accepts if made
no worse off by accepting.
If the initial asset distribution is symmetric, meaning
that the fraction of each type holding one unit of asset j is
Aj, and if trading strategies are symmetric, then an equilib-
rium can be described solely in terms of trading strategies.
Moreover, since the labeling of assets is arbitrary, I can,
without loss of generality, use a notation that presumes
that asset 2 is at least as valuable as asset 1. Then a sym-
metric equilibrium can be deﬁned as a sequence of three
quantities of goods produced in single-coincidence meet-
ings: c1, the quantity produced when the consumer starts
with asset 1 and the producer starts with nothing; c2, the
quantity produced when the consumer starts with asset 2
and the producer with nothing; and c12, the quantity pro-
duced when the consumer starts with asset 2 and the pro-
ducer with asset 1. An equilibrium sequence of these three
quantities can be deﬁned in terms of the following best-
response function. A given such sequence, treated as a
trading strategy followed by everyone else, determines a
trading environment and, hence, determines an individual
best-response sequence for an individual—the date t ele-
ment which consists of the three quantities produced in
the different possible single-coincidence meetings at that
date. A symmetric equilibrium is a sequence of the three
quantities produced that is a ﬁxed point of this best-re-
sponse function. I will discuss what is known about con-
stant sequences that are symmetric equilibria.
Although it does not produce the coexistence we seek,
it is helpful to begin with the special case of two ﬁat ob-
jects: r1 = r2 = 0. There is a constant equilibrium in
which the two ﬁat objects are valuable and not distin-
guished (one with c1 = c2 = c* > 0 and c12 = 0) and one
in which both are valuable and distinguished (c1 = c* and
c12 > 0). In the second equilibrium, the more valuable ﬁat
object, object 2, may or may not be traded for goods only;
if it is, then c2 > c1 (Aiyagari, Wallace, and Wright 1996).
In this second equilibrium, a sufficient condition for the
more valuable object to be traded for goods only is that
the discount factor is bounded away from unity (sufficient
impatience), while a sufficient condition for it not to be so
traded is that thediscount factor issufficiently close touni-
ty (sufficient patience). When the more valuable object is
not traded for goods only, people pass up the opportunity
to spend it all at once, even though that means waiting for
ameetingwithaproducerwhohasthelessvaluableobject.
Theonlyotherconstantequilibriaareonesinwhichatleast
one of the ﬁat objects is valueless.
Now suppose we let one of the assets have a positive
dividend and the other a zero dividend. If the positive div-
idend issufficientlysmall,thenbywayoftheimplicitfunc-
tion theorem, there are constant equilibria that are in the
neighborhood of the equilibria noted above in which both
ﬁat objects are valuable. As we now explain, any one of
these constant equilibria exhibits a version of the coexis-
tence we are seeking.
Corresponding to the constant equilibrium in which the
two ﬁat objects are not distinguished is one in which c2 >
c1 > c* and c12 > 0; the positive dividend asset is asset 1,
the less valuable asset; and c1 ® c*, c2 − c1 ® 0, and
c12 ® 0 as the dividend approaches zero. Even though as-
sets are not traded in markets of the usual sort, there are
transactions in which each asset is traded for an amount of
the good, amounts which an observer would treat as asset
prices. Since these amounts are constant through time, an
observer would conclude that asset prices are constant.
Therefore, the observer would conclude that there is a pos-
itive rate of return on the positive dividend asset (because
of the positive dividend) and a zero rate of return on the
ﬁat object.
Corresponding to the constant equilibrium in which the
two ﬁat objects are distinguished and valuable are two dif-
ferent constant equilibria when one of the assets has a
positive and sufficiently small dividend. In one, the posi-
tive dividend asset is the less valuable asset; in the other,
it is the more valuable asset. In either case, the constancy
of asset prices implies a positive rate of return for the posi-
tive dividend asset and a zero rate of return for the ﬁat
object.
As regards transaction patterns, this model does not as-
sign a more signiﬁcant medium-of-exchange role to the
ﬁat object than to the positive dividend asset. The trans-
action pattern has the ﬁat object appearing in every trade
only in the equilibrium in which the positive dividend as-
set is the more valuable asset and only when the param-
eters are such that the more valuable asset is not traded
for goods only (a discount factor close enough to unity).
In all other cases, the positive dividend asset trades for
goods only.
Although we have obtained coexistence of positive and
zero rate-of-return assets from a very simple model, the
model is extreme in a number of respects. It has two fea-
tures that inhibit trade: (1) pairwise meetings and private
information about trading histories and (2) indivisible as-
sets and an upper bound of unity on asset holdings. The
model satisﬁes the dictum because these features apply to
all trade. In particular, (2) applies to both the ﬁat object
and the positive dividend object. Moreover, each feature
seems to play an important role. If we replace (1) by as-
suming that everyone is together or that there is public in-
formation about individual trading histories while main-
taining all the other assumptions, then we have a version
of an ordinary Arrow-Debreu environment. And although
we would not have to adopt the competitive equilibrium
concept, we would be tempted to do so. If we did, then we
would ﬁnd that the ﬁat object is necessarily worthless. Al-
though I don’t know what happens if we amend (2) while
maintaining allthe other assumptions,it is possiblethat we
lose coexistence if both assets are perfectly divisible. (The
implicit function theorem argument used when the assets
are indivisible does not apply because the steady states for
r1 = r2 = 0 are not locally unique if the assets are perfectly
divisible.) In particular, if indivisibility is necessary, then
that tells us that a divisible positive dividend asset of the
sort in this model is too good an asset to coexist with a ﬁat
object even if trade is subject to the frictions of pairwise
meetings and private information about trading histories.
Conclusion
Why is satisfaction of the dictum desirable? The answer
seems obvious. The models that do not satisfy it force the
modeler to specify the favored assets—for example, those
that contribute to utility, those that constitute the cash of
CIA models, or those that have relatively low transaction
costs. How can such assumptions be defended? One wayis by appeal to history, by appeal to data. However, such
appeal is rarely straightforward.
8 How should history be
used to determine how Mexican pesos appear in the utility
functions of Mexican residents or which class of goods
Mexican residents must buy with Mexican pesos now and
in the future? Even if the observations were less ambigu-
ous than they are, we would still need to argue that the fu-
ture will be like the past—a long future since most models
are inﬁnite-horizon models. Of necessity, any defense of
a speciﬁcation that does not satisfy the dictum will end up
being in terms of a speciﬁcation that does. Hence, asking
for satisfaction of the dictum is nothing but asking for ex-
plicitness—for laying one’s cards on the table.
Although building models that satisfy the dictum might
beacceptedasareasonablegoalformonetarytheory,don’t
we, in the meantime, have to make do with models that do
not satisfy it—because the models that do satisfy the dic-
tumarenotrichenoughinordertoaddressthepolicyques-
tions that are always before us? For example, although we
obtainedcoexistenceofaﬁatobjectandapositivedividend
asset in the model described above, there is no scope for
policyinthatmodelasitstands.(SeeAiyagariandWallace
1991foranargument.)Whiletheviewthatittakesamodel
(that addresses the issue at hand) to beat a model (that ad-
dresses the issue at hand) seems unexceptional, too much
efforthasbeendevotedtobuildingmodelsthatfailtosatis-
fy the dictum in the name of such expediency.
What, after all, have we learned and can we expect to
learn from such models? They have produced one main
conclusion:theso-calledFriedmanruleaccordingtowhich
the yield on money ought to be brought into equality with
that on other assets. (See Woodford 1990 for a survey of
the literature on the Friedman rule.) However, every mod-
el that implies this rule is one that fails to satisfy the dic-
tum, and some that do satisfy the dictum do not imply the
rule. In particular, Levine’s (1991) asymmetric informa-
tion model is one in which the features that make a ﬁat
object essential for achieving good allocations are exactly
the features that contradict the Friedman rule. More gen-
erally, the models that give rise to the Friedman rule are
onesthatsolveHicks’(1935)coexistenceproblembytheir
assumptionsaboutwhatobjectsyieldutility,arethecashin
CIA models, or have low transaction costs—assumptions
that violatethe dictum. Therefore, weought to be skeptical
abouttherobustnessoftheFriedmanrule,robustnessinthe
sense of validity in models that satisfy the dictum.
Perhaps the most telling defect of models that fail to
satisfy the dictum is that they are dead ends; they are con-
versation stoppers. As noted above, it is impossible to dis-
cuss what constitutes the cash of a CIA model without
abandoningthatframeworkinfavorofonethatsatisﬁesthe
dictum. In contrast, the kind of model described in the last
section leads immediately to additional questions concern-
ing the effects of various generalizations and amendments
of its assumptions. Progress in monetary theory will be
made by asking and pursuing the answers to such ques-
tions.
*This essay is reprinted, with permission, from the book Foundations of Research
in Economics: How Do Economists Do Economics?, edited by Steven G. Medema and
Warren J. Samuels, pp. 248–59 (Chapter 21), Cheltenham, U.K.: Edward Elgar Pub-
lishing, 1996. © Steven G. Medema and Warren J. Samuels 1996.
†The author is indebted to many colleagues for comments on an earlier draft.
However, since he suspects that at least some would not like to be associated with the
views set forth, he has decided to let all remain anonymous.
‡When this essay was written and originally published, the author was Barnett
Banks Professor of Money and Banking at the University of Miami.
1For example, it is the kind of policy poked fun at in Sargent and Wallace 1982.
2The term medium of exchange is often introduced as one of three functions of
money, the other two being unit of account and store of value. In the spirit of not using
money as a primitive term, these three functions can be discussed not as functions of
money, but as observations that we may want to explain. The medium-of-exchange ob-
servation is that one object or a small number of objects are involved in most trans-
actions. The unit-of-account observation is that prices are expressed in terms of one
object or a small number of objects. The store-of-value observation is that the object
or objects that play a medium-of-exchange role and/or play a unit-of-account role are
also objects that are assets—objects that are held through time. However, somewhat
paradoxically for the store-of-value function, the challenging and crucial observation
is that those objects seem often to be relatively poor stores of value.
3Thus, the quantity theory is not in the running, where the quantity theory means
the SGE model augmented by one equation, the quantity equation, in one unknown,
the price level. Patinkin’s (1965) famous argument that such a model fails to satisfy
Walras’ law is, of course, correct. However, that failure is only one symptom of the in-
coherence of the resulting model. The SGE model is a complete model; it describes
people, their preferences, their endowments. Nowhere in it is the money that appears
in the quantity equation. So who is holding and trading the money in the quantity equa-
tion?
4The appearance of a price in utility and production functions gives rise to an ex-
ternality (since other agents’ demands affect prices), which accounts for the failure of
a competitive equilibrium in such models to be Pareto efficient.
5Notice that noxious odor varies with the weight or volume of the asset, not with
its value.
6Such an assumption can play a role by preventing the occurrence of trades in
which one or more of the participants are indifferent to trading.
7Since types are identical except as regards what is consumed and produced, it is
plausible that there are equilibria that are symmetric among types.
8I am reminded of Stein’s (1979) description of monetarism: “The theory that
there is a stable and predictable relation between the price level as effect and the supply
of money as cause. This theory has ﬁrm empirical support if the deﬁnition of the
money supply is allowed to vary in an unstable and unpredictable way.”
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